Accounting Historians Journal
Volume 6
Issue 1 Spring 1979

Article 2

1979

New insights from cost accounting into British entrepreneurial
performance circa 1914
Robert R. Locke

Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal
Part of the Accounting Commons, and the Taxation Commons

Recommended Citation
Locke, Robert R. (1979) "New insights from cost accounting into British entrepreneurial performance circa
1914," Accounting Historians Journal: Vol. 6 : Iss. 1 , Article 2.
Available at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol6/iss1/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Archival Digital Accounting Collection at eGrove. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Accounting Historians Journal by an authorized editor of eGrove. For more
information, please contact egrove@olemiss.edu.

Locke: New insights from cost accounting into British entrepreneurial pe

Robert R. Locke
UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII

NEW INSIGHTS FROM COST ACCOUNTING INTO
BRITISH ENTREPRENEURIAL PERFORMANCE
CIRCA 1914
Abstract: This article takes issue with economic historians who have tried to rehabilitate the reputation of the late Victorian and Edwardian entrepreneur. It argues that the revisionist attempt to ground their case on cost, profit, and productivity calculations flounders because of an insufficient analysis of the factors
involved in arriving at cost, profit, and productivity. The economic historian,
preoccupied with recent European economic development could, therefore, improve
his analysis by incorporating the science of management accounting into his
methodology. A companion piece to this article will be published in the fall issue
of the journal.

Few if any problems in British economic history have drawn more
attention than that of British economic performance during the late
Victorian and Edwardian eras. Optimists have argued that the British
economy functioned well, pessimists that it faltered badly, and the
pessimists have usually had the upper hand in the debate. Recently
a group of younger historians, led by Donald N. McCloskey, has decidedly challenged the pessimists' view. "There i s . . . , " McCloskey
wrote, " little left of the dismal picture of British failure painted by
historians. The alternative is a picture of an economy not stagnating
but growing as rapidly as permitted by the growth of its resources
and the effective exploitation of available technology." 1 Revisionists
do not claim that the British economy expanded as rapidly as the
American or the German; indeed some, unlike McCloskey, might
even concede a relative economic stagnation. But they do not concede that the British entrepreneur can be faulted. Economic facts
limited his parameter of action but within that parameter he performed well.
This article rejects the optimists' interpretation of British entrepreneurial performance. It is, however, less concerned with conclusions
than with how conclusions have been reached, for much of the
revisionism stems directly from the application of a "new" methodology, grounded in economic theory and quantification. 2 The
contention is, therefore, that inadequacies in the optimists' conclu-
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sions arise, to a considerable extent, from shortcomings in historical
method. Ideas taken from cost accounting will be used in this two
part essay to establish the validity of the contention.
The first part deals with epistemological problems raised by revisionist econometrics. Macroeconomics is the wellspring of the revisionism, but macroeconomics is not the only science that is concerned with economic activity. Carl Menger pointed this out in the
19th century when he described
. . the separation of the sciences
into historical and theoretical. History and the statistics of economy are historical sciences . .
economics is a theoretical science."
But he added that there is
still a third [science], the nature of which is essentially
different from that of the two previously named; we mean
the so-called practical sciences or technologies. The sciences of this type do not make us aware of phenomena,
either from the historical point of view or from the theoretical; they do not teach us what is. Their problem is rather
to determine the basic principles by which, according to
the diversity of conditions, efforts of a definite kind can be
most suitably pursued. They teach us what the conditions
are supposed to be for definite human aims to be achieved. 3
The "third science" is important because it has developed over the
past hundred years into business administration, a field in which the
cost accounting technology that is now called management accounting finds its place. Cost accounting is an entrepreneurial technology
par excellence. As a bookkeeping system which deals primarily
with the accurate reporting of internal financial information, it is of
interest not only to businessmen but to historians trying to evaluate
entrepreneurial performance. Unfortunately, historians have not used
the sciences of business administration in general and cost accounting in particular to facilitate their analysis of recent European
economic development. 4 This is somewhat surprising considering
the extent to which business schools have grown in American colleges and universities over the past eighty years. A significant
methodological tool is at hand but because historians have ignored
it even the new economic history has suffered scientifically, as this
brief study of its use of data on costs, profits, and productivity will
show.
The second part of the paper (to be published in the fall issue)
will demonstrate how the development of cost accounting theory
and practice can itself be considered an index of entrepreneurial
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prowess in an economy. There is, of course, no necessary correlation between entrepreneurial excellence and a developed cost
accounting technology. Sydney Pollard, in The Genesis of Modern
Management, has stated, for example, that "[T]he practice of using
accounts as direct aids to management was not one of the achievements of the British industrial revolution.. ." 5 Yet if throughout most
of the 19th century profit margins were large enough, in Britain at
least, for businessmen to be rather negligent about cost factors,
with the keen industrial competition of the "great depression" (after
1873) cost consciousness heightened and cost accounting flourished.6 First only prime costs, i.e., direct labor and raw materials
costs drew the owners' and hence the bookkeepers' attention; but,
as industry grew in organizational complexity and in plant sophistication and size, a third cost classification, burden (or overhead)
occupied people's minds. Accounts for indirect labor costs (including the cost of management itself), for installation charges (lights,
power, etc.), and for an ever more diversified inventory, which the
new market economy required, were created. Capital equipment
replacement, whose costs became progressively higher, had to be
provided for in depreciation accounts that integrated depreciation
allowances into the cost structure of manufactured products. After
1880, then, an elaborate manufacturing cost accounting system
arose. After 1900 sales and distribution accounts were added in
order to determine marketings' share of total product cost. And
finally, after 1910, historical costs gave way to standard costing and
budgeting as management strived to create accounting tools suitable
for measuring costs, profits, and productivity in an increasingly
complex industrial world. The institutionalization, during the Second
Industrial Revolution, of entrepreneurial performance in the form of
good accounting procedure became, therefore, in itself a factor in
the creation of industrial efficiency. Indeed, a leading accounting
historian, A. C. Littleton, has remarked, "It is not too much to say that
the formulation of cost accounting procedures can be ranked as an
achievement second only to the original development of bookkeeping
according to double-entry principles..." in management technology.7
Although economic historians realized long ago that bookkeeping
played an important role in modern European economic development, they have not, like some accounting historians, devoted much
attention to cost accounting. 8 A survey of major periodicals shows,
for example, that neither The Journal of Economic History nor
Explorations in Economic History has ever published an article on
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cost accounting; that The Economic History Review, aside from a
recent article on "Josiah Wedgewood and Cost Accounting in the
Industrial Revolution," only printed one other article on bookkeeping (not cost accounting); and that even the Business History Review
has neglected the subject. 9 Only the article on the Dupont de
Nemours Powder Co., 1903-1914, really deals with the contribution
of a cost accounting system to a firm's success, and this firm, of
course, was American. 10 Since cost accounting became a "necessary" technology in European as well as American industry after
1880, the second section of the paper will show how the institutionalization of this management technology did not speak well for
British entrepreneurship.
First, however, a critique of revisionist quantitative work must be
done. In "From Damnation to Redemption: Judgments on the late
Victorian Entrepreneur," Donald N. McCloskey and Lars G. Sandberg state that they and others (including Roderick Floud, Charles
Harley, Peter Lindert, and Keith Trace) have utilized a variety of
analytical techniques to refute the hypothesis of British entrepreneurial failure." Nonetheless, the authors continue
this gives a misleading impression of heterogenity of purpose in the new work. The various measures used are essentially identical. Higher profits can be achieved if more
output can be produced with the same input, that is, if productivity can be raised. The measuring rod for entrepreneurial failure, then, can be expressed indifferently as the
money amount of profit foregone, as the proportion by
which foreign exceeded British productivity, as the distance
between foreign and British production functions, or as the
difference in cost between foreign and British techniques.
All of these give the same result and each can be translated
exactly into any one of the other. 12
Nothing about this statement would be methodologically foreign to
a cost accountant. Although profits do depend on the market, undoubtedly they can be increased if "more output can be produced
with the same input," e.g., if the prime costs (material and direct
labor) and overhead costs can be reduced in the manufacture of a
particular product the profits will be greater. Moreover the factors
involved in the calculation of inputs and outputs employed in a productivity index are the same as those used in the calculation of production costs and profits. Still, the idea that a productivity figure, a
profit statement, or a cost statistic can be used as a "measuring
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rod" for entrepreneurial performance is not necessarily true. Productivity, cost, and profit are not factors in themselves but the result
of economic activities that combine a multitude of factors. In some
cases the factors which are involved in the calculation of cost, profit,
or productivity reveal superior, in other cases poor, entrepreneurial
performance even though the actual costs, profit, or productivity
figures are the same. Entrepreneurial performance can be evaluated, as the science of cost accounting shows, only after the factors
involved in the calculation of productivity, cost, or profit have been
isolated and assessed.
Thus, since the revisionist historians work with productivity, cost,
and profit figures, the validity of their statements about entrepreneurial performance depends on their analysis of the factors that go
into the compilation of productivity, cost, or profit statistics. And in
this respect their work is deficient. Three examples of insufficient
factor analysis, picked at random from a collection of studies, will
be used to substantiate this charge. The first is Donald N. McCloskey's study of productivity in the iron and steel industries of Britain
and America before World War I . " The second is Charles Harley's
analysis of the change from sail to steam power in the British merchant marine. 14 And the third is Roderick Floud's work on the machine tool firm Greenwood & Batley, 1856 to 1900. 15 The three
studies are quite different in method and content but all suffer from
inadequate factor presentation.
McCloskey, in his well-known quest to save the reputation of
British entrepreneurs, claims that productivity in the British and the
American steel industries was approximately the same before World
War I (in fact Britain might have had a slight edge). This proves, he
contends, that America had no technological advantage in this industry and, hence, that American entrepreneurial performance was
not superior to British in this industry. Since pig iron was the most
significant cost item in steel production he sought to prove his case
by concentrating the analysis on comparative pig iron production. 16
McCloskey assumed that the marginal product of the pig iron used
in the production of steel rails can be determined by dividing the
price of pig iron by the price of steel rails. From this calculation he
determined that the marginal product of pig iron used in British and
American steel rails did not vary significantly and that the productivity levels (average market price of pig iron divided by average
market price of steel rails) were comparable. 17 It is not McCloskey's
productivity calculations but the technological conclusion he draws
from them which is at stake here. These conclusions are question-
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able because relative factor costs in pig iron production must be
considered when relative technological performance is evaluated.
Some of these factors could represent obsolescent, others progressive technology and the factor mix could be so different in the two
countries that a technological gap could exist between their steel industries despite a temporary productivity parity.
Because McCloskey's article does not provide data for this factor
analysis, Sydney Pollard's study of British shipyards in 1904 will be
used to illustrate this contention. 18 Pollard observed that, since productivity per man in British shipyards was 12.5 tons as compared to
6.8 tons in the United States and 3.3 tons in Germany, Britain had
an overwhelming productivity lead. He goes on to remark, however,
There is little doubt that much of the equipment found in
British yards was less advanced than that in America and
Germany. British yards had their ancient steam engines to
generate power, their lathes and plate-bending machines,
but, as far as the installation of hydraulic, pneumatic, or
electric power transmission was concerned, or the use of
mechanical yard transport . . ., even electrical lights, most
of them were years behind their chief foreign rivals, and
visiting foreign experts could seldom conceal their astonishment at this backwardness. 19
Obviously, in this industry, superior British productivity had nothing
to do with technological advantages. Pollard's explanation: Britain's
lead in fact is not technological. British shippers, who had long
dominated world trade, ordered ships at such a rate that British
shipbuilders, unlike their foreign competitors, could specialize in
production, thereby enjoying economies of scale. 20 Because of the
early start, moreover, British yards had been able to train an abundant supply of excellent artisans, boilermakers, shipwrights, and
managers to build the ships. British shipyards acquired productivity
advantages, then, because Britain's early commercial supremacy
gave them a market and a trained labor force that their rivals did
not have.
Pollard's article shows why good productivity should not automatically be equated with good technology. Better British productivity
in 1904 probably resulted from the last positive effects of an old
technology than from the first fruits of a new. As Pollard, referring
to Britain's competitors, put it,
In the absence of a pool of skilled labor, foreign shipbuilders were obliged to install expensive equipment much of

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol6/iss1/2

6

Locke: New insights from cost accounting into British entrepreneurial pe

Locke:

New Insights

of British

Entrepreneurial

Performance—1914

23

which could not pay unless and until all processes had become much more mechanized and shipbuilding had become a true mass-production industry.21
Unless British entrepreneurs modernized their yards they would,
when shipbuilding became a mass production industry in the 20th
century, lose their productivity edge. Indeed the advantages of 1904
later would obstruct technological progress, for artisanal labor
would fight to keep the old system rather than be replaced by the
semiskilled machine operators typical of mass production industry.
At the moment British shipbuilding held this productivity lead, then,
the industry was already obsolescent.
The technological capabilities of the British, German, or American
shipbuilding, iron and steel, or any other industry cannot be divined
from productivity figures unless the factors which determined total
costs have been scrutinized. Economic historians cannot assume
that the cost factors were the same in two industries. It could have
been, for example, that in one country industry had invested heavily
in new plant and equipment while in another it had not. If that were
the case then one overhead cost (depreciation) could be very high
in one and very low in another industry. This could mean that the
capitalists had kept prices low and profits high through shortsighted
investment policy. Any intelligent cost accountant would know that
these entrepreneurs were engaging in business folly, even though
the stockholders might be taken in by the good dividends, and the
economic historians by the low prices. Whether this happened in
either the British or American pig iron industry is not known. McCloskey's view that productivity rates correlated with technological
performance, therefore, could be right or it could be wrong. The fact
that American iron and steel productivity subsequently outstrips
British, as McCloskey himself acknowledges, suggests that he is
wrong, for superior American technology, which accounts for this
subsequent productivity gap, might have existed earlier. But, since
no factor analysis was done, there is no way of knowing from the
data presented in this essay whether its postulates are true.
The basic assumption in Harley's article is the following: as the
steam engine became progressively more efficient coal consumption
was reduced to a point where the cost of running steamships equalized and then fell below that of running sailing ships. He concluded,
therefore, that a technological factor, engine efficiency, determined
when a shipping line shifted from sail to steam. Harley did not prove
his case directly by studying fuel consumption costs. Rather he
found out which lines converted to steam on which voyages, and
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when. His discovery that the time of conversion depended on the
length of voyage (i.e., steam was first used on short hauls, then introduced on longer hauls) supported a technological explanation for
the shift, i.e., storage space for the bulky engine fuel prohibited profitable longer voyages until more efficient engines reduced fuel consumption.
McCloskey and Sandberg claim that Harley
. . reconstructed the
production and cost functions for sailing and steamship, through
which he was able to examine the speed with which entrepreneurs
replaced one with the other as their relative profitability changed." 22
This is an extraordinary assertion. Cost accounting affirms that labor, material, and overhead are the principal cost divisions. To have
done what McCloskey and Sandberg claim, Harley would have had
to look at costs in all three categories for both sailing ships and
steamships. He clearly did no such thing. He isolated one cost factor only, fuel, and assumed, since the time of conversion correlated
with length of voyage, that engine efficiency determined the pace of
change. But one major cost factor cannot be decisive unless it is
considered with other major cost factors. It is possible, if improbable, either that sailing ship labor costs increased steadily and considerably, or that coal fuel costs fell drastically over a long period,
thereby shifting the cost advantage away from sail to steam. The
speculation is, moreover, potentially important. If rising labor costs
on sailing ships were responsible for the conversion to steam, it
could no longer be directly attributed to a technological factor.
Harley's work is to be praised for its originality but it certainly falls
short of the methodological thoroughness that has been claimed.
Roderick Floud used Greenwood & Batley's cost accounts to determine the firm's long-term productivity record (1856-1900). He
concluded that ". . . Greenwood & Batley were achieving considerable increased productivity" during the period. 23 The question is
whether Floud's productivity index is reliable. He preferred to use
the capital invested in equipment manufacturing machine tools as
one element in his index but was forced, because of the firm's poor
bookkeeping, to abandon the idea. Instead he made the metal
weight of the machines producing machine tools the input and the
metal weight of the machine tools produced the output. If the
amount of metal contained in the machine tools produced by a machine tool increased in relation to the weight of the producing machine, productivity improved. The index depends, therefore, on a
very important assumption; namely, that the producing machine tool
did not vary in weight during the period. If it did then the constant
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with which he sought to measure productivity (increase of metal in
machine produced in relation to the weight of producing machine)
would become unstable and the productivity index would collapse.
Floud realized the importance of his assumption. 24 But he did not
give much evidence to prove that it was justified. He simply referred
to some contemporary observations and moved on. Econometrics
seeks to replace the subjectivity of argument-by-example from contemporary literary sources with the objective exactitude of statistical
compilation. It seems inadequate, therefore, to produce a lot of statistical evidence to prove that one factor important to a calculation
is true (i.e., that machine tools produced more weight in the machines manufactured) but none to show the validity of a second (that
the weight of the producing machine tools remained unchanged).
Furthermore, the connection between entrepreneurial capacity
and technological progress, which was Floud's ultimate concern,
was examined inadequately. The period covered brought the transition from iron to steel construction; metal strengths greatly increased in relation to weights. It is hard to believe that this revolution in metallurgy did not affect the weight of producing machine
tools but if it did not that fact must be explained. Floud hinted at
the importance of the metallurgical question. He noted that, with the
introduction of high speed steel, the machine tools had to be completely redesigned. But he added that these changes happened after
1900. This means, then, that Floud really studied this company during a period of technologically stagnation in the design and manufacture of machine tools. Greenwood and Batley cannot receive
kudos for entrepreneurial prowess, despite a favorable productivity
record, when world technology was dormant. A more useful question might be: how did Greenwood & Batley respond when the use of
high-speed steels induced technological movement in machine tool
design and manufacture? Floud does not answer this question. He
stated only: "Such steels were introduced in the United States in the
1890s, but there was a delay in their introduction in Britain." 25
One only has to read the minutes of the discussions which followed the papers printed in the volume from which these examples
have been taken to realize the great extent to which the work suffers
from methodological insufficiencies. Cost accounting theory emphasizes the complexity of profit, cost, and productivity determination,
especially when such factors as depreciation and inflation have to
be considered. Cost accounting practice shows the risky nature of
generalizations about technological performance from productivity
indices, particularly when the factor evidence is contradictory. Cost
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accounting history reveals that uniform accounting practices were
not followed before 1914, which raises doubts about the reliability
of the statistics used in econometric studies. With such evidence no
capable cost accountant could talk very confidently to his boss
about a firm's comparative profit, cost, and productivity achievements. And economic historians, faced with conclusions about the
good performance of British entrepreneurs, should be circumspect
when these conclusions are based on incomplete data, collated
some seventy years after events, which are subject to very different
interpretations. At least the historians should be skeptical when
these conclusions run counter to those of experienced contemporary
management engineers and cost accountants who found British entrepreneurial and technological performance markedly deficient.
FOOTNOTES
1

McCloskey, Did, p. 459.
The strength of the optimists' case rests, by their own insistence, on the superiority of a methodology. McCloskey notes, for example, that "The route by which
this and other conclusions . . . were reached is perhaps even more significant for
British economic historiography in the long run than the conclusions themselves."
McCloskey, Essays, p. 7. Indeed, for McCloskey the cliometric rescue of the British
entrepreneur has become an indisputable historical truth. See, McCloskey, The
Achievements, p. 23.
3
Menger, p. 38.
4
Although two influential business historians, N. S. B. Gras and Henrietta Larson,
defined business history as "primarily the study of the administration of business
units in the past" neither they nor the business history community used the analytical tools being developed in schools of business administration. Certainly they
have ignored cost accounting.
5
Pollard, Genesis, p. 288.
6
An editorial on "Practical Prime Costs" in Engineering (1891) said that up to
twenty years before "selling prices could generally be fixed at figures leaving good
margins, and a 'rough and ready' cost of a certain article or piece work, upon
which generally could be fixed a fancy profit, with a liberal contingency allowance,
was as a rule found all that was required. . . . It is during the past 15 or 20 years
that prime costing has been developed to the elaborate systems in operation in
many of our large and well-managed firms." Solomons, p. 19.
7
Littleton, p. 359.
8
This point has also been made by H. Thomas Johnson in The Role, p. 444.
9
McKendrick, pp. 45-67.
10
Johnson, Management, pp. 184-204.
11
McCloskey and Sandberg, p. 103.
12
McCloskey and Sandberg, p. 103.
13
McCloskey, International, pp. 285-309.
14
Harley, pp. 215-37.
15
Floud, pp. 313-44.
16
See also McCloskey, Productivity Change, pp. 281-96. Although, in this work,
McCloskey establishes a productivity index on the basis of relative factor mix in
2
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British pig iron production he does not do the same for the American industry.
Thus there is no basis for comparing the relative factor mix in both countries. He
states that the mix between coke, iron ore, labor, and capital, remained constant
in the British industry throughout the period. He also says that British productivity
did not grow during the period. What was the factor mix in America? Did it also
remain constant? The questions are important because America did achieve productivity gains between 1885 and 1913.
17

Calculations are given in McCloskey, International,

18

Pollard, British, pp. 426-44.

19

Pollard, British, p. 437.

pp. 297-98.

20

Pollard writes, "Of the superiority in skill, labour and management at that
time, based on tradition and on an efficient system of apprenticeship, contemporaries had little doubt. American wages were higher than British by a third at
least, a difference that more than outweighed any possible higher productivity
gained by mechanical equipment (while overheads were, of course, much higher)."
Pollard, British, p. 437.
21
Pollard, British, p. 437.
22
McCloskey and Sandberg, p. 103.
23
Floud, p. 336.
24
Floud, p. 322.
25
Floud, p. 343.
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